## 1AC

### Inherency

#### The first two nuclear plants in Belarus are on the way now.

Nielsen ’12 Earthquake zone on EU border to host Belarus nuclear plant NIKOLAJ NIELSEN, 30. MAR 2012, https://euobserver.com/belarus/115329

The drive toward the site of Belarus' future nuclear power plant goes through tall pine and white birch trees. The woods here, and in nearby Bialowieza, are among Europe's last primordial forests. Located near the Lithuanian frontier, the nuclear facility will be just 50 kilometres away from Vilnius. The first of its two reactors is to go online in 2017. The second in 2018. "The decision to build the station was entirely political ... It makes no sense to build it here. It's a fault line and the closest water source is 10 kilometres away," a Belarusian geologist - who does not want to reveal his name and who lost his job last year because a close relative spoke out against President Alexander Lukashenko - told this website. Another, better-suited, location had been identified in the east of the country, he noted. But Russia pushed for the Lithuania-border site to "test" the Europeans. The new plant will use water from the Vilia river - which is called Neris in Lithuania, and which hugs the edge of Vilnius' historic city centre. Meanwhile, the Geological Survey of Lithuania says around 40 earthquakes of significant size have struck the region since the 17th century. A tremor in 2004 registered 5.3 on the Richter scale in Vilnius. "The area selected for the new [Belarus facility] experienced the strongest earthquake ... in the history of Belarus," the Lithuanian foreign ministry told EUobsever by email. The 7.0 quake struck in 1909. Lithuania spent two years trying to get Belarus to build the plant further away and to use a different water source - a line in Minsk's 3,500-plus-page-long environmental impact assessment reportedly says radioactive and chemical contamination of the Vilia/Neris will be "within allowable limits." It failed, and construction began in 2011.

### Plan text

#### Resolved: the Republic of Belarus ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.

### Accidents Adv.

#### The plant has not followed NPP safety protocol and Belarus has no intention of subjecting its plant to inspection—makes accidents inevitable.

UA Today ’16 http://uatoday.tv/society/belarus-nuclear-power-plant-disaster-waiting-to-happen-or-is-lithuania-blowing-dangers-out-of-proportion-669203.html Belarus Nuclear Power Plant: Disaster waiting to happen or is Lithuania overreacting?

Despite all the assurances from Minsk, Vilnius insisted the project was built violating numerous international safety code requirements. Shortly before the construction started, Lithuanian Ministry of Environment released its statement on the situation saying Belarus failed to conduct all the necessary research and establish all the risks the nuclear power plant posed. Watch also Chornobyl: Thirty years later Lithuanian critics also slammed Belarusian intentions to use the local river as the main source of water supply for the plant. They stated, eventually, all the technical substances from the plant would end up in the river. Additionally, the experts said, the water temperature would inevitably increase, which could make all the fish vanish. These allegations were made 6 years ago, and Lithuanian position hasn't changed since then. "We are not such idiots", Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei recently said in response to those claims. "As a country, that suffered the most from the Chornobyl accident, we would never build an unsafe power plant". The Minister claimed, raising such projects near densely populated areas was nothing new. As he pointed out, several nuclear power plants in Belgium and Serbia were even closer to big cities, than the Belarusian one. Furthermore, he added, an active Lithuanian power plant was located only two kilometres away from the Belarusian border. The Minister was quite emotional calling the situation around the construction "political Bacchanalia" and "anti-Belarusian hysteria". He assured the project was absolutely safe for everyone. However, Lithuanian officials weren't persuaded by any of this, though. The country's Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevicius said Belarus didn't do enough to refute the fears. "We have three demands, and I want to repeat them. We want to create an international commission, which will monitor the building. But Belarus has declined this proposition" Linkevicius said in an interview with Belarusian media outlet Charter97. Among the other demands the Minister mentioned stress-tests of the power plant. "They must be done in accordance to European standards. Because currently Rosatom wants to test itself, without European experts." And the last demand is the examination of the construction site. "It must have been conducted before the building started. And still, we want it done now", Linkevicius said. Both countries say they are open to negotiations. But so far it remains unclear if Belarus will agree to any of the terms Lithuania is proposing. Despite the issues, Minsk continues with the construction of the very first Belarusian power plant. According to official information, the first energy unit should be done by 2018, the second one – by 2020. Rosatom assures, all the lessons from the Chornobyl and Fukushima catastrophes have been learned. "The Earth is such a beautiful planet, but I wish it was bigger. Because if something happens, when the Belarusian nuclear power plant is built, there will be nowhere to hide", said Svetlana Alexievich, a 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature winner. Her words serve as a reminder, that everyone should fully understand responsibility for their actions.

#### The plants are not safe from either earthquake or aerial terror attack.

Backaitis ’12 Dangers from Proposed Belarus and Russian Nuclear Power Plants to Lithuania Dr. Stan (Stasys) Backaitis, P.E., SAE Fellow Lithuanian American Council 2012

The recent Fukushima nuclear accident has focused the international community on the need to evaluate the risks and consequences of all possible scenarios potentially placing nuclear reactors at risk. Notwithstanding this international consensus, Belarusan and Russian authorities continue to ignore, or at best minimize, the risks of earthquakes on the reactors at the proposed NPP sites. Belarus in the EIA states that: There is a zone in the southwest part of the region (...) In 1908, according to the archives and literary sources, a big earthquake took place in Ostrovetsky district with the epicentre being near the settlement of Gudoai. It measured 6-7 on the MSK-64 scale and the effects were substantial in magnitude. However, in the following sentence, Belarus authorities assert that the “....maximum probable earthquake magnitude would not be expected to exceed a level of 5,” based on their own self-serving and unsubstantiated evaluation that there exists a “...low probability of stronger earthquake.” Russia has not made any public earthquake assessments in the Kaliningrad region, even though in the immediate vicinity of the proposed NPP a Richter 5 level earthquake was recorded as late as 2004. Furthermore, Ivan Grabelnikov, the chief engineer overseeing the Kaliningrad NPP project, in the course of a technical conference conceded that neither the VVER- 1200 reactors nor its buildings have undergone simulation testing with respect to potential aircraft crashes at the site. On the other hand, nuclear facilities operating in Western Europe are currently required to substantiate that new reactors will be able to withstand such impacts. A direct plane crash into a reactor containment building would not only destabilize the reactor, but would also jeopardize the integrity of the onsite storage facilities housing the spent but still radioactive nuclear fuel. To the best of LAC’s knowledge, no protection is provided against such incidents at either the Kaliningrad or Belarus sites. This is especially disconcerting as there exists a major northsouth flight corridor over the planned NPP site in Belarus. It is also a matter of record that in 2005, a Russian fighter jet actually crashed in Lithuania near the planned Kaliningrad NPP site.

#### There are ZERO net-benefits to plant construction—they don’t have the economy or infrastructure; means there’s only risk that something goes wrong.

Keller ’10 ON THE BELARUSIAN ENERGY DILEMMA: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR POWER OPTION BY JAMES WILLIAM KELLER THESIS Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010

Notwithstanding these fundamental issues, they are nevertheless tangential to the socioeconomic impacts which completion of the project could exert on domestic issues. Economically, the project will deepen the Belarusian administration‟s enormous debt and expand its loan commitments to Russia, even though the BNPP will result in significant reductions in yearly expenditures for Russian gas. Ecologically, although it could marginally reduce Belarus‟s greenhouse gas emissions thanks to nuclear power‟s light carbon footprint, a major malfunction could devastate the largest remaining primeval forest in Europe and decimate the local ecotourist industry. And even in the case of stringent enforcement of all codes, laws and regulations set forth by the IAEA (to which Belarusian officials claim to assert allegiance), water sources used in the plant for energy production processes and cooling could forseeably warm these sources, negatively impacting fish stocks and the potability of local drinking water. Psychologically it could strengthen the so-called “nuclear renaissance” in the region or serve to escalate and concretize the public‟s justifiable aversion to it due to Chernobyl. No matter the case, the BNPP has the potential to heavily impact and reorient the country‟s socio-economic and socio-political trajectories. According to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, motivations for constructing the BNPP include reducing the overall cost of domestic energy production, creating energy export opportunities throughout Eastern Europe, limited local energy resources, diversifying energy supply options and decreasing imported supplies of both natural gas and oil.39 While all of these constitute legitimate reasons for implementing energy reform, especially amid strains over natural gas subsidies and the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania in December of 2009, the viability of introducing nuclear power into the exigent energy portfolio is premature and ultimately unnecessary, something to which both logic and the emerging literature both attest. With a badly outdated and inefficient energy infrastructure, not to mention the stratospheric price tag of implementing nuclear power for a country which cannot even pay its gas bills without foreign intervention, Belarus has no business considering such a scenario. Even though nuclear power is increasingly popular in developing countries such as China and India, and with new projects springing up in Finland, Lithuania and Russia, Belarus has little in the way of existing infrastructure, storage and waste facilities or technical expertise to carry out the plant‟s construction and maintenance, necessitating heavy foreign involvement. In a time of global financial turmoil and uncertainty, now is not the time to merely hope that initial estimates pan out and the plant proves its viability in reducing foreign resource dependency. For no other reason than prevailing economic conditions and Belarus‟s currently shaky fiscal and monetary disposition, nuclear power should not even be the last option; rather, it should be expunged from all domestic production scenarios. Less costly initiatives such as modernizing traditional power plants, introducing energy saving programs and exploiting Belarus‟s biomass, solar and wind power capabilities deserve special emphasis, since much of the infrastructure is in place and the initial capital investment would pale compared to the costs of nuclear power, not to mention the fact that such initiatives are specifically tagged for special funding for the EU‟s periphery through the EP.

#### The academic consensus is that the plants are a terrible idea—their construction is only desired because of authoritarian arrogance by the government.

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Based on the foregoing analysis, and especially in light of the VNPP project which would be completed at roughly the same time as the BNPP, a Belarusian nuclear plant is nonsensical and presents a sub-optimal choice economically, ecologically and geopolitically for Belarusian national interests. Thus, why is it still being realistically considered? The literature on the topic is overwhelmingly negative, with the stances of virtually all but government officials ranging from mild surprise and perplexity to outright condemnation of the project. The truth of the matter is that Lukashenka is insistent on bringing the project to fruition, even amid all of its uncertainties and contradictions, and no one is definite as to why. Nevertheless, his reluctance to abandon the project could be realistically attributed to a combination of the following two factors: Authoritarian resilience. Small authoritarian states in the post-Soviet realm and elsewhere have become surprisingly resilient, and Lukashenka‟s Belarus is an excellent example. They tire of being influenced by external actors who claim to know what is best for them and their economic and political progress. The belief that such a regime needs to prove its independent mettle, that it can handle internal issues and projects without external input, is often prevalent, and largely characterizes Minsk‟s frustration with both Russia and the West; and Belarusian sovereignty. Prior to the Putin presidency, Lukashenka was pro-Union State and believed he could realistically challenge Boris Yeltsin for the office of presidency if such a political entity was forged. Since Putin came to power in May of 2000, however, movement toward a political union has slowed dramatically. Realizing that his maximal power base would extend only as far as Belarus‟s international borders, Lukashenka has repeatedly stressed Belarusian sovereignty and asserted his role as the defender of the Belarusian nation, characterizing external pressures as brazen attacks on Belarus‟s sovereignty. Thus, although as a policy option the pursuit of nuclear power is riddled with contradictory holes, to him it goes beyond policy and is as part of his larger claims to political power. As a result, he does not wish to be seen capitulating to the influence of outside actors, thereby appearing weak and potentially losing his only bastion of remaining authority. This is the major motivation behind the „For Belarus‟ campaign, a nationally-based slogan designed to rally support for defending Belarus which, by implication, defends him from being deposed.

#### Asymmetrical access to information regarding the build exists—the government controls all access to reasonable information; means the pro NPP position should face extreme scrutiny.

Novikau ’16 Nuclear power debate and public opinion in Belarus: From Chernobyl to Ostrovets Aliaksandr Novikau Northern Arizona University, USA Public Understanding of Science 1– 14 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0963662516647242

The nuclear power debate in Belarus demonstrates that nuclear risk communication in the country is affected by the political structure of the Belarusian society. Authoritarian politics affected all three participants in the communication process – the sender, the transmitter and the receiver. The information provided by governmental research institutions – both nuclear and sociological – was deliberately constructed in such a way as to fit with the prevailing political agenda. The mainstream media was turned into passive transmitters, amplifying the governmental voice. Finally, the public and NGOs were not only excluded from the decision-making process but also had their voices muted. Thus, the debate turned into a one-way provision of risk information to the public by governmental structures. Although formally this type of risk communication can be defined as ‘first level debates’ (Jaeger et al., 2001: 133), simply providing information can hardly be viewed as an authentic risk debate because of the lack of necessary mutual trust and respect. The issue of trust remains crucial in all nuclear debates in Belarus – from Chernobyl to Ostrovets. Discussing post-Chernobyl issues in the former Soviet Union, Shlyakhter and Wilson (1992) conclude, ‘Once trust is lost, it is difficult to regain. It is particularly hard when the people are asked to believe that the effects of radiation, which they do not understand, are limited’ (p. 255). The absence of proper communication inevitably affects public understanding of risk. When discussing post- Chernobyl issues in Belarus, Kuchinskaya (2011) rightfully says, ‘Without adequate conditions for public discussion and articulation, an affected population cannot be assumed to hold special knowledge about imperceptible hazards and their effects or to be the most risk-conscious’ (p. 419). For the nuclear energy issues discussed in Belarus during recent decades, the situation is quite similar. ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ obviously exists in Belarus. Moreover, it still dominates public opinion about nuclear energy. However, the syndrome is not the irrational fear of nuclear energy, as the pro-nuclear coalition in Belarus tends to define it. In a situation in which the majority of the population has personally experienced the negative consequences of Chernobyl, to talk of their fears of nuclear power as irrational is problematic. Obviously, trust cannot be regained simply by providing technical and economic ‘rational’ arguments. Only through an understanding of social concerns and proper responses during authentic dialogues, mutual trust can be gained.

### Framework

#### Phenomenal introspection is reliable and proves that util’s true.

Sinhababu Neil (National University of Singapore) “The epistemic argument for hedonism” [http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3 accessed 2-4-16](http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3%20accessed%202-4-16) JW

The Odyssey's treatment of these events demonstrates how dramatically ancient Greek moral intuitions differ from ours. It doesn't dwell on the brutality of Telemachus, who killed twelve women for the trivial reasons he states, making them suffer as they die. While gods and men seek vengeance for other great and small offenses in the Odyssey, no one finds this mass murder worth avenging. It's a minor event in the denouement to a happy ending in which Odysseus (who first proposes killing the women) returns home and Telemachus becomes a man. That the[y] Greeks could so easily regard these murders as part of a happy ending for heroes shows how deeply we disagree with them. It's as if we gave them a trolley problem with the 12 women on the side track and no one on the main track, and they judged it permissible for Telemachus to turn the trolley and kill them all. And this isn't some esoteric text of a despised or short-lived sect, but a central literary work of a long-lived and influential culture. Human history offers similarly striking examples of disagreement on a variety of topics. These include sexual morality; the treatment of animals; the treatment of other ethnicities, families, and social classes; the consumption of intoxicating substances; whether and how one may take vengeance; slavery; whether public celebrations are acceptable; and gender roles.12 Moral obligations to commit genocide were accepted not only by some 20th century Germans, but by much of the ancient world, including the culture that gave us the Old Testament. One can only view the human past and much of the present with horror at the depth of human moral error and the harm that has resulted. One might think to explain away much of this disagreement as the result of differing nonmoral beliefs. Those who disagree about nonmoral issues may disagree on the moral rightness of a particular action despite agreeing on the fundamental moral issues. For example, they may agree that healing the sick is right, but disagree about whether a particular medicine will heal or harm. This disagreement about whether to prescribe the medicine won't be fundamentally about morality, and won't support the argument from disagreement. I don't think the moral disagreements listed above are explained by differences in nonmoral belief. This isn't because sexists, racists, and bigots share the nonmoral views of those enlightened by feminism and other egalitarian doctrines – they don't. Rather, their differing views on nonmoral topics often are rationalizations of moral beliefs that fundamentally disagree with ours.13 Those whose fundamental moral judgments include commitments to the authority of men over women, or of one race over another, will easily accept descriptive psychological views that attribute less intelligence or rationality to women or the subjugated race.14 Moral disagreement supposedly arising from moral views in religious texts is similar. Given how rich and many-stranded most religious texts are, interpretive claims about their moral teachings often tell us more about the antecedent moral beliefs of the interpreter than about the text itself. This is why the same texts are interpreted to support so many different moral views. Similar phenomena occur with most moral beliefs. Environmentalists who value a lovely patch of wilderness will easily believe that its destruction will cause disaster, those who feel justified in eating meat will easily believe that the animals they eat don't suffer greatly, and libertarians who feel that redistributing wealth is unjust will easily believe that it raises unemployment. We shouldn't assume that differing moral beliefs on practical questions are caused by fundamental moral agreement combined with differing nonmoral beliefs. Often the differing nonmoral beliefs are caused by fundamental moral disagreement. As we have no precise way of quantifying the breadth of disagreement or determining its epistemic consequences, it's unclear exactly how much disagreement the argument requires. While this makes the argument difficult to evaluate, it shouldn't stop us from proceeding, as we have to use the unclear notion of widespread disagreement in ordinary epistemic practice. If 99.9% of botanists agree on some issue about plants, non-botanists should defer to their authority and believe as most of them do. But if disagreement between botanists is suitably widespread, non-botanists should remain agnostic. A more precise and systematic account of when disagreement is widespread enough to generate particular epistemic consequences would be very helpful. Until we have one, we must employ the unclear notion of widespread disagreement, or some similar notion, throughout epistemic practice. Against the background of widespread moral disagreement, there may still be universal or near-universal agreement on some moral questions. For example, perhaps all cultures agree that one should provide for one’s elderly parents, even though they generally disagree elsewhere. How do these narrow areas of moral agreement affect the argument? This all depends on whether the narrow agreement is reliably or unreliably caused. If narrow agreement results from a reliable process of belief-formation, it lets us avoid error, defeating the argument from disagreement. But widely accepted moral beliefs may result from widely prevailing unreliable processes leading everyone to the same errors. There's no special pressure to explain agreement in terms of reliable processes when disagreement is widespread. Explaining agreement in terms of reliable processes is preferable when we have some reason to think that the processes involved are generally reliable. Then we would want to understand cases of agreement in line with the general reliability of processes producing moral belief. But if disagreement is widespread, error is too. Since moral beliefs are so often false, invoking unreliable processes to explain them is better than invoking reliable ones. The next two sections discuss this in more detail. We have many plausible explanations of narrow agreement on which moral beliefs are unreliably caused. Evolutionary and sociological explanations of why particular moral beliefs are widely accepted often invoke unreliable mechanisms.15 On these explanations, we agree because some moral beliefs were so important for reproductive fitness that natural selection made them innate in us, or so important to the interests controlling moral education in each culture that they were inculcated in everyone. For example, parents' influence over their children's moral education would explain agreement that one should provide for one's elderly parents. Plausible normative ethical theories won't systematically connect these evolutionary and sociological explanations with moral facts. If disagreement and error are widespread, they'll provide useful ways to reconcile unusual cases of widespread agreement with the general unreliability of the processes producing moral belief. 1.3 If there is widespread error about a topic, we should retain only those beliefs about it formed through reliable processes Now I'll defend 3. First I'll show how the falsity of others' beliefs undermines one's own belief. Then I'll clarify the notion of a reliable process. I'll consider a modification to 3 that epistemic internalists might favor, and show that the argument accommodates it. I'll illustrate 3's plausibility by considering cases where it correctly guides our reasoning. Finally, I'll show how 3 is grounded in the intuitive response to grave moral error. First, a simple objection: “Why should I care whether other people have false beliefs? That's a fact about other people, and not about me. Even if most people are wrong about some topic, I may be one of the few right ones, even if there's no apparent reason to think that my way of forming beliefs is any more reliable.” While widespread error leaves open the possibility that one has true beliefs, it reduces the probability that my beliefs are true. Consider a parallel case. I have no direct evidence that I have an appendix, but I know that previous investigations have revealed appendixes in people. So induction suggests that I have an appendix. Similarly, I know on the basis of 1 and 2 that people's moral beliefs are, in general, rife with error. So even if I have no direct evidence of error in my moral beliefs, induction suggests that they are rife with error as well. 3 invokes the reliability of the processes that produce our beliefs. Assessing processes of belief-formation for reliability is an important part of our epistemic practices. If someone tells me that my belief is entirely produced by wishful thinking, I can't simply accept that and maintain the belief. Knowing that wishful thinking is unreliable, I must either deny that my belief is entirely caused by wishful thinking or abandon the belief. But if someone tells me that my belief is entirely the result of visual perception, I'll maintain it, assuming that it concerns sizable nearby objects or something else about which visual perception is reliable. While providing precise criteria for individuating processes of belief-formation is hard, as the literature on the generality problem for reliabilism attests, individuating them somehow is indispensable to our epistemic practices.16 Following Alvin Goldman's remark that “It is clear that our ordinary thought about process types slices them broadly” (346), I'll treat cognitive process types like wishful thinking and visual perception as appropriately broad.17 Trusting particular people and texts, meanwhile, are too narrow. Cognitive science may eventually help us better individuate cognitive process types for the purposes of reliability assessments and discover which processes produce which beliefs. Epistemic internalists might reject 3 as stated, claiming that it isn't widespread error that would justify giving up our beliefs, but our having reason to believe that there is widespread error. They might also claim that our justification for believing the outputs of some process depends not on its reliability, but on what we have reason to believe about its reliability. The argument will still go forward if 3 is modified to suit internalist tastes, changing its antecedent to “If we have reason to believe that there is widespread error about a topic” or changing its consequent to “we should retain only those beliefs about it that we have reason to believe were formed through reliable processes.” While 3's antecedent might itself seem unnecessary on the original formulation, it's required for 3 to remain plausible on the internalist modification. Requiring us to have reason to believe that any of our belief-formation processes are reliable before retaining their outputs might lead to skepticism. The antecedent limits the scope of the requirement to cases of widespread error, averting general skeptical conclusions. The argument will still attain its conclusion under these modifications. Successfully defending the premises of the argument and deriving widespread error (5) and unreliability (7) gives those of us who have heard the defense and derivation reason to believe 5 and 7. This allows us to derive 8. (Thus the pronoun 'we' in 3, 6, and 8.) 3 describes the right response to widespread error in many actual cases. Someone in the 12th century, especially upon hearing the disagreeing views of many cultures regarding the origins of the universe, would do well to recognize that error on this topic was widespread and retreat to agnosticism about it. Only when modern astrophysics extended reliable empirical methods to cosmology would it be rational to move forward from agnosticism and accept a particular account of how the universe began. Similarly, disagreement about which stocks will perform better than average is widespread among investors, suggesting that one's beliefs on the matter have a high likelihood of error. It's wise to remain agnostic about the stock market without an unusually reliable way of forming beliefs – for example, the sort of secret insider information that it's illegal to trade on. 3 permits us to hold onto our moral beliefs in individual cases of moral disagreement, suggesting skeptical conclusions only when moral disagreement is widespread. When we consider a single culture's abhorrent moral views, like the Greeks' acceptance of Telemachus and Odysseus' murders of the servant women, we don't think that maybe the Greeks were right to see nothing wrong and we should reconsider our outrage. Instead, we're horrified by their grave moral error. I think this is the right response. We're similarly horrified by the moral errors of Hindus who burned widows on their husbands' funeral pyres, American Southerners who supported slavery and segregation, our contemporaries who condemn homosexuality, and countless others. The sheer number of cases like this requires us to regard moral error as a pervasive feature of the human condition. Humans typically form moral beliefs through unreliable processes and have appendixes. We are humans, so this should reduce our confidence in our moral judgments. The prevalence of error in a world full of moral disagreement demonstrates how bad humans are at forming true moral beliefs, undermining our own moral beliefs. Knowing that unreliable processes so often lead humans to their moral beliefs, we'll require our moral beliefs to issue from reliable processes. 1.4 If there is widespread error about morality, there are no reliable processes for forming moral beliefs A reliable process for forming moral beliefs would avert skeptical conclusions. I'll consider several processes and argue that they don't help us escape moral skepticism. Ordinary moral intuition, whether it involves a special rational faculty or our emotional responses, is shown to be unreliable by the existence of widespread error. The argument from disagreement either prevents reflective equilibrium from generating moral conclusions or undermines it. Conceptual analysis is reliable, but delivers the wrong kind of knowledge to avert skepticism. If all our processes for forming moral beliefs are unreliable, moral skepticism looms. 4 is false only because of one process – phenomenal introspection, which lets us know of the goodness of pleasure, as the second half of this paper will discuss. Widespread error guarantees the unreliability of any process by which we form all or almost all of our moral beliefs. While widespread error allows some processes responsible for a small share of our moral beliefs to predominantly create true beliefs, it implies that any process generating a very large share of moral belief must be highly error-prone. Since the process produced so many of our moral beliefs, and so many of them are erroneous, it must be responsible for a large share of the error. If more of people's moral beliefs were true, things would be otherwise. Widespread truth would support the reliability of any process that produced most or all of our moral beliefs, since that process would be responsible for so much true belief. But given widespread error, ordinary moral intuition must be unreliable. This point provides a forceful response to Moorean opponents who insist that we can't give up the reliability of a process by which we form all or nearly all of our beliefs on an important topic, since this would permit counterintuitive skeptical conclusions. Even if this Moorean response helps against external world skeptics who employ counterfactual thought experiments involving brains in vats, it doesn't help against moral skeptics who use 1 and 2 to derive widespread actual error. Once we accept that widespread error actually obtains, a great deal of human moral knowledge has already vanished. Insisting on the reliability of the process then seems implausible and pointless. I'll briefly consider two conceptions of moral intuition – as a special rational faculty by which we grasp non-natural moral facts, and as a process by which our emotions lead us to form moral beliefs – and show how widespread error guarantees their unreliability. Some philosophers regard moral intuition as involving a special rational faculty that lets us know non-natural moral facts.18 They argue that knowledge on many topics including mathematics, logic, and modality involves this rational faculty, so moral knowledge might operate similarly. This suggests a way for them to defend the reliability of moral intuition in the face of widespread error: if intuition is reliable about these other things, its overall reliability across moral and nonmoral areas allows us to reliably form moral beliefs by using it. This defense won't work. When an epistemic process is manifestly unreliable on some topic, as widespread error shows any process responsible for most of our moral beliefs to be, the reliability of that process elsewhere won't save it on that topic. Even if testimony is reliable, this doesn't imply the reliability of compulsive gamblers' testimony about the next spin of the roulette wheel. Even if intuition remains reliable elsewhere, widespread disagreement still renders it unreliable in ethics. I see ordinary moral intuition as a process of emotional perception in which our feelings cause us to form moral beliefs.19 Just as visual experiences of color cause beliefs about the colors of surfaces, emotional experiences cause moral beliefs. Pleasant feelings like approval, admiration, or hope in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are right, virtuous or good. Unpleasant emotions like guilt, disgust, or horror in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are wrong, vicious, or bad. We might have regarded this as a reliable way to know about moral facts, just as visual perception is a reliable way to know about color, if not for widespread error. But because of widespread error, we can only see it as an unreliable process responsible for our dismal epistemic situation. Reflective equilibrium is the prevailing methodology in normative ethics today. It involves modifying our beliefs about particular cases and general principles to make them cohere. Whether or not nonmoral propositions like the premises of the argument from disagreement are admissible in reflective equilibrium, widespread error prevents reflective equilibrium from reliably generating a true moral theory, as I'll explain. If the premises of the argument from disagreement are admitted into reflective equilibrium, the argument can be reconstructed there, and reflective equilibrium will dictate that we give up all of our moral beliefs. To avoid this conclusion, the premises of the argument from disagreement would have to be revised away on moral grounds. These premises are a metaethical claim about the objectivity of morality which seems to be a conceptual truth, an anthropological claim about the existence of disagreement, a very general epistemic claim about when we should revise our beliefs, and a more empirically grounded epistemic claim about our processes of belief-formation and their reliability. While reflective equilibrium may move us to revise substantive moral beliefs in view of other substantive moral beliefs, claims of these other kinds are less amenable to such revision. Unless ambitious arguments for revising these nonmoral claims away succeed, we must follow the argument to its conclusion and accept that reflective equilibrium makes moral skeptics of us.20 If only moral principles and judgments are considered in reflective equilibrium, it won't make moral skeptics of us, but the argument from disagreement will undermine its conclusions. The argument forces us to give up the pre-existing moral beliefs against which we test various moral propositions in reflective equilibrium. While we may be justified in believing something because it coheres with our other beliefs, this justification goes away once we see that those beliefs should be abandoned. Coherence with beliefs that we know we should give up doesn't confer justification. Now I'll consider conceptual analysis. It can produce moral beliefs about conceptual truths – for example, that the moral supervenes on the nonmoral, and that morality is objective. It also may provide judgments about relations between different moral concepts – perhaps, that if the only moral difference between two actions is that one would produce morally better consequences than the other, doing what produces better consequences is right. I regard conceptual analysis as reliable, so that the argument from disagreement does not force us to give up the beliefs about morality it produces. Unfortunately, if analytic naturalism is false, as has been widely held in metaethics since G. E. Moore, conceptual analysis won't provide all the knowledge we need to build a normative ethical theory.21 Even when it relates moral concepts like goodness and rightness to each other, it doesn't tell us that anything is good or right to begin with. That's the knowledge we need to avoid moral skepticism. So far I've argued that our epistemic and anthropological situation, combined with plausible metaethical and epistemic principles, forces us to abandon our moral beliefs. But if a reliable process of moral belief-formation exists, 4 is false, and we can answer the moral skeptic. The rest of this paper discusses the only reliable process I know of. 2.1 Phenomenal introspection reveals pleasure's goodness Phenomenal introspection, a reliable way of forming true beliefs about our experiences, produces the belief that pleasure is good. Even as our other processes of moral belief-formation prove unreliable, it provides reliable access to pleasure's goodness, justifying the positive claims of hedonism. This section clarifies what phenomenal introspection and pleasure are and explains how phenomenal introspection provides reliable access to pleasure's value. Section 2.2 argues that pleasure's goodness is genuine moral value, rather than value of some other kind. In phenomenal introspection we consider our subjective experience, or phenomenology, and determine what it's like. Phenomenal introspection can be reliable while dreaming or hallucinating, as long as we can determine what the dreams or hallucinations are like. By itself, phenomenal introspection doesn't produce beliefs about things outside experience, or about relations between our experiences and non-experiential things. So it doesn't produce judgments about the rightness of actions or the goodness of non-experiential things. It can only tell us about the intrinsic properties of experience itself. Phenomenal introspection is generally reliable, even if mistakes about immediate experience are possible. Experience is rich in detail, so one could get some of the details wrong in belief. Under adverse conditions involving false expectations, misleading evidence about what one's experiences will be, or extreme emotional states that disrupt belief-formation, larger errors are possible. Paradigmatically reliable processes like vision share these failings. Vision sometimes produces false beliefs under adverse conditions, or when we're looking at complex things. Still, it's so reliable as to be indispensible in ordinary life. Regarding phenomenal introspection as unreliable is about as radical as skepticism about the reliability of vision. While contemporary psychologists reject introspection into one's motivations and other psychological causal processes as unreliable, phenomenal introspection fares better. Daniel Kahneman, for example, writes that “experienced utility is best measured by moment-based methods that assess the experience of the present.”22 Even those most skeptical about the reliability of phenomenal introspection, like Eric Schwitzgebel, concede that we can reliably introspect whether we are in serious pain.23 Then we should be able to introspectively determine what pain is like. So I'll assume the reliability of phenomenal introspection. One can form a variety of beliefs using phenomenal introspection. For example, one can believe that one is having sound experiences of particular noises and visual experiences of different shades of color. When looking at a lemon and considering the phenomenal states that are yellow experiences, one can form some beliefs about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're bright experiences. And when considering experiences of pleasure, one can make some judgments about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're good experiences. Just as one can look inward at one's experience of lemon yellow and recognize its brightness, one can look inward at one's experience of pleasure and recognize its goodness.24 When I consider a situation of increasing pleasure, I can form the belief that things are better than they were before, just as I form the belief that there's more brightness in my visual field as lemon yellow replaces black. And when I suddenly experience pain, I can form the belief that things are worse in my experience than they were before. Having pleasure consists in one's experience having a positive hedonic tone. Without descending into metaphor, it's hard to give a further account of what pleasure is like than to say that when one has it, one feels good. As Aaron Smuts writes in defending the view of pleasure as hedonic tone, “to 'feel good' is about as close to an experiential primitive as we get.” 25 Fred Feldman sees pleasure as fundamentally an attitude rather than a hedonic tone.26 But as long as hedonic tones are real components of experience, phenomenal introspection will reveal pleasure's goodness. Opponents of the hedonic tone account of pleasure usually concede that hedonic tones exist, as Feldman seems to in discussing “sensory pleasures,” which he thinks his view helps us understand. Even on his view of pleasure, phenomenal introspection can produce the belief that some hedonic tones are good while others are bad. There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences. There are sensory pleasures, like the pleasure of tasting delicious food, receiving a massage, or resting your tired limbs in a soft bed after a hard day. There are the pleasures of seeing that our desires are satisfied, like the pleasure of winning a game, getting a promotion, or seeing a friend succeed. These experiences differ in many ways, just as the experiences of looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day differ. It's easy to see the appeal of Feldman's view that pleasures “have just about nothing in common phenomenologically” (79). But just as our experiences in looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day have brightness in common, pleasant experiences all have “a certain common quality – feeling good,” as Roger Crisp argues (109).27 As the analogy with brightness suggests, hedonic tone is phenomenologically very thin, and usually mixed with a variety of other experiences.28 Pleasure of any kind feels good, and displeasure of any kind feels bad. These feelings may or may not have bodily location or be combined with other sensory states like warmth or pressure. “Pleasure” and “displeasure” mean these thin phenomenal states of feeling good and feeling bad. As Joseph Mendola writes, “the pleasantness of physical pleasure is a kind of hedonic value, a single homogenous sensory property, differing merely in intensity as well as in extent and duration, which is yet a kind of goodness” (442).29 What if Feldman is right and hedonic states feel good in fundamentally different ways? Then phenomenal introspection suggests a pluralist variety of hedonism. Each fundamental flavor of pleasure will have a fundamentally different kind of goodness, as phenomenal introspection more accurate than mine will reveal. This isn't my view, but I suggest it to those convinced that hedonic tones are fundamentally heterogenous. If phenomenal introspection reliably informs us that pleasure is good, how can anyone believe that their pleasures are bad? Other processes of moral belief-formation are responsible for these beliefs. Someone who feels disgust or guilt about sex may not only regard sex as immoral, but the pleasure it produces as bad. Even if phenomenal introspection on sexual pleasure disposes one to believe that it's good, stronger negative emotional responses to it may more strongly dispose one to believe that it's bad, following the emotional perception model suggested in section 1.4. Explaining disagreement about pleasure's value in terms of other processes lets hedonists maintain that phenomenal introspection univocally supports pleasure's goodness. As long as negative judgments of pleasure come from unreliable processes instead of phenomenal introspection, the argument from disagreement eliminates them. The parallel between yellow’s brightness and pleasure’s goodness demonstrates the objectivity of the value detected in phenomenal introspection. Just as anyone's yellow experiences objectively are bright experiences, anyone's pleasure objectively is a good experience.30 While one's phenomenology is often called one's “subjective experience”, facts about it are still objective. “Subjective” in “subjective experience” means “internal to the mind”, not “ontologically dependent on attitudes towards it.” My yellow-experiences objectively have brightness. Anyone who thought my yellow-experiences lacked brightness would be mistaken. Pleasure similarly is objectively good. It's true that anyone's pleasure is good. Anyone who denies this is mistaken. As Mendola writes, the value detected in phenomenal introspection is “a plausible candidate for objective value” (712). Even though phenomenal introspection only tells me about my own phenomenal states, I can know that others' pleasure is good. Of course, I can't phenomenally introspect their pleasures, just as I can't phenomenally introspect pleasures that I'll experience next year. But if I consider my experiences of lemon yellow and ask what it would be like if others had the same experiences, I must think that they would be having bright experiences. Similarly, if in a pleasant moment I consider what it's like for others to have exactly the experience I'm having, I must think that they're having good experiences. If they have exactly the same experiences I'm having, their experiences will have exactly the same intrinsic properties as mine. This is also how I know that if I have the same experience in the future, it'll have the same intrinsic properties. Even though the only pleasure I can introspect is mine now, I should believe that others' pleasures and my pleasures at other times are good, just as I should believe that yellow experienced by others and myself at other times is bright. My argument thus favors the kind of universal hedonism that supports utilitarianism, not egoistic hedonism.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing happiness. Prefer the standard:

#### 1. No intent foresight distinction – by willing any action with knowledge that it could cause X harm, we necessarily intend X to happen because we could always decide not to act. Thus, means-based frameworks devolve to the aff.

#### 2. Actor specificity. Policymaking must be consequentialist since collective action results in conflicts that only util can resolve. Side constraints paralyze state action since policy makers have to consider tradeoffs between multiple people. States lack intentionality since they're composed of multiple individuals—there is no act-omission distinction for them since they create permissions and prohibitions in terms of policies so authorizing action could never be considered an omission since the state assumes culpability in regulating the public domain.

#### 3. Reductionism: personal identity doesn’t exist.

Olson Eric T. (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield) “Personal Identity” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Oct 28, 2010 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#PsyApp> JW

Whatever psychological continuity may amount to, a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach is that you could be psychologically continuous with two past or future people at once. **If your cerebrum**—the upper part of the brain largely responsible for mental features—**were transplanted, the recipient would be** psychologically continuous with **you** by anyone's lights (even if there would also be important psychological differences). The Psychological Approach implies that she would be you. If we destroyed one of your cerebral hemispheres, the resulting being would also be psychologically continuous with you. (Hemispherectomy—even the removal of the left hemisphere, which controls speech—is considered a drastic but acceptable treatment for otherwise-inoperable brain tumors: see Rigterink 1980.) What **if we** did both at once, **destroy**ing **one hemisphere and transplant**ing **the other**? Then too, **the one who got the transplant**ed hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and according to the Psychological Approach **would be you.** But now **suppose** that **both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head.** (We needn't pretend, as some authors do, that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) **The two recipients**—call them Lefty and Righty—**will each be** psychologically continuous with **you.** The Psychological Approach as I have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. **But that cannot be**: Lefty and Righty are two, and **one thing cannot be** numerically identical with **two things.** Suppose Lefty is hungry at a time when Righty isn't. If you are Lefty, you are hungry at that time. If you are Righty, you aren't. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: **a contradiction.**

#### This means consequentialism – moral theories can’t focus on individuals since there’s nothing that unifies them across time. Only states of affairs can have value.

#### 4. Determinism is true: our bodies are controlled by biological principles only – there’s no room for free will.

Drescher Gary L. (Visiting Fellow at the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, PhD in Computer Science from MIT) “Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics” Bradford Books May 5th 2006

One prominent notion is that we have both a ghostlike component (our consciousness or soul) and a mechanical component (everything else, including our body). The mechanical component is governed by the usual physical laws. The ghostlike component, unconstrained by those laws, can be said to be extraphysical. That is, the ghostlike component is something in addition to the kinds of things that exist in the physical realm, something ontologically extra.1 This so-called dualist view was advanced by Descartes in the 1600s. Dualism is a tempting compromise, but an awkward one, for reasons that are well known. The problem is that the mechanical principles that govern each particle of our bodies (and of the things around us) already specify how each of those particles behaves, which in turn specifies how each of us behaves as a whole. But in that case, there is no room for the ghostlike component to have any influence—if it did so, it would have to make some of the particles sometimes violate the principles that all particles are always observed to obey whenever we check carefully. (Descartes was admirably precise about the locus of this supposed intervention—he proposed that the interface between the ghostlike component and the physical world occurs within the brain in the pineal gland.)2 Thus, we have the mind– body problem: how can we reconcile the nature of the mind with the mechanical nature of the body? Some see quantum-mechanical uncertainty as the wiggle room that could let a ghostlike consciousness nudge some of the particles in our body without violating the rules of physics. But in fact—even apart from the newer, deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics discussed in chapter 4—any such nudging would at least constitute a change in the probability distribution for some of the particles in our body, and even that would break the (probabilistic) rules that particles always seem to obey. Granted, it could be the case that particles somewhere in our brains behave differently than particles ever do when we watch them carefully, violating otherwise exceptionless rules (be they deterministic or probabilistic rules). But since the rules are otherwise exceptionless (as far as we can tell), there should be a strong presumption that there’s no exception in our brains either—especially in view of the longstanding retreat of other beliefs about the alleged physically exceptional behavior of conscious or living organisms. The doctrine of vitalism, for instance, supposed that there is some distinctive ‘‘life force’’ that animates living things, enabling them to grow and move. But the more we learned of biochemistry—DNA and RNA, ATP energy cycles, neurotransmitters, and the like—the more we understood that the growth and movement of living things is explicable in terms of the same molecular building blocks, following the same exceptionless rules, as when those building blocks exist outside of animate objects. And the more we learn about computation and neuroscience, the more we discover how cognitive processes that were once supposed to require an ethereal spirit—perception, motor control, memory, spatial reasoning, even key aspects of more general reasoning (e.g., deduction, induction, planning)—can be implemented by basic switching elements (e.g., neurons or transistors) that need not themselves be conscious, or even animate. By monitoring brain activity, we can see different regions of the brain performing computations when different sorts of cognitive functions are performed (language, singing, spatial imaging, etc.). And when certain brain regions are damaged by injury or illness, the corresponding cognitive abilities degrade or vanish. To be sure, we are still far from understanding human cognition as a whole. But the trend in our knowledge does not lend comfort to the expectation that any particles in our brain will, at long last, ever be found to deviate sometimes from the same rules that such particles otherwise always obey.

#### Only consequentialism is consistent with determinism.

Greene and Cohen Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen (Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, Princeton University) “For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything” November 26th 2004 Phil.Trans.R.Soc.Lond.B (2004)359,1775–1785 <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693457/pdf/15590618.pdf> JW

The forward-looking–consequentialist approach to punishment works with all three responses to the problem of free will, including hard determinism. This is because consequentialists are not concerned with whether anyone is really innocent or guilty in some ultimate sense that might depend on people’s having free will, but only with the likely effects of punishment. (Of course, one might wonder what it means for a hard determinist to justify any sort of choice. We will return to this issue in x 8.) The retributivist approach, by contrast, is plausibly regarded as requiring free will and the rejection of hard determinism. Retributivists want to know whether the defendant truly deserves to be punished. Assuming one can deserve to be punished only for actions that are freely willed, hard determinism implies that no one really deserves to be punished. Thus, hard determinism combined with retributivism requires the elimination of all punishment, which does not seem reasonable. This leaves retributivists with two options: compatibilism and libertarianism. Libertarianism, for reasons given above, and despite its intuitive appeal, is scientifically suspect. At the very least, the law should not depend on it. It seems, then, that retributivism requires compatibilism. Accordingly, the standard legal account of punishment is compatibilist.

### ROTB

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the simulated consequences of the aff policy. Prefer this

#### 1. The state is inevitable- speaking the language of power through policymaking is the only way to create social change in debate.

Coverstone 5 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 JW 11/18/15

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

#### 2. Fairness.

#### Anything moots 6 minutes of 1ac offense – restarts the 1ar. They get a 13-7 minute advantage which means we have worse discussion, even if the subject of discussion is slightly better.

#### Independently, there is a huge spectrum of political theories – the k can be the radical on both sides of the spectrum and multifunctional aff offense is insufficient to interact with every one.

#### Preparation asymmetry – the aff says a ton of things all of which might have representational implications. Holding me accountable for things that are not just the plan lets them pick on issue and prep it all out so affs lose every round.

#### Unfairness denies effective dialogue on kritikal issues which turns your impacts.

Galloway 7 Ryan Galloway, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

#### Focusing on reps is bad:

#### Critique is useless without a concrete policy option that solves for your harms.

Bryant 12 Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College) “A Critique of the Academic Left” 2012 <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/> JW

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignor[es]ing how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express [critiques] them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.

#### Excessive focus on discourse and representations kills the liberal movements you seek to promote.

Chait 15 Jonathan Chait “How the language police are perverting liberalism.” NY Magazine January 275h 2015 <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html> JW

Or maybe not. The p.c. style of politics has one serious, possibly fatal drawback: It is exhausting. Claims of victimhood that are useful within the left-wing subculture may alienate much of America. The movement’s dour puritanism can move people to outrage, but it may [and] prove ill suited to the hopeful mood required of mass politics. Nor does it bode well for the movement’s longevity that many of its allies are worn out. “It seems to me now that the public face of social liberalism has ceased to seem positive, joyful, human, and freeing,” confessed the progressive writer Freddie deBoer. “There are so many ways to step on a land mine now, so many terms that have become forbidden, so many attitudes that will get you cast out if you even appear to hold them. I’m far from alone in feeling that it’s typically not worth it to engage, given the risks.” Goldberg wrote recently about people “who feel emotionally savaged by their involvement in [online feminism] — not because of sexist trolls, but because of the slashing righteousness of other feminists.” Former Feministing editor Samhita Mukhopadhyay told her, “Everyone is so scared to speak right now.” That the new political correctness has bludgeoned even many of its own supporters into despondent silence is a triumph, but one of limited use. Politics in a democracy is still based on getting people to agree with you, not making them afraid to disagree. The historical record of political movements that sought to expand freedom for the oppressed by eliminating it for their enemies is dismal. The historical record of American liberalism, which has extended social freedoms to blacks, Jews, gays, and women, is glorious. And that glory rests in its confidence in the ultimate power of reason, not coercion, to triumph.

### Underview

#### 1. Prefer a comparing worlds paradigm—the neg must prove proactive desirability of a competitive advocacy. Truth-testing gives the neg an infinite amount of NIBs-they can prove morality doesn’t exist, it’s inaccessible, or read multiple side constraint theories. If they have to prove desirability then they share assumptions with the aff which levels out the playing field, so it’s key to fairness. This takes out textuality standards on T because they presume my burden is to prove the resolution is true

#### 2. Aff gets 1AR theory- otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this. 1AR theory is drop the debater- the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance- you must be punished.

#### 3. Vote aff if I win a counter interp to T

A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible unless I can collapse to the top layer.

#### 4. If the neg wins T, reevaluate my offense underneath their interp by dropping the aff advocacy, not the aff offense.

A. Substantive education – 1AR restart means we still get to discuss the topic and learn as opposed to devoting the whole round to theory.

B. Stratskew – there are multiple bidirectional interps that every aff will violate, a frontlined neg will always win the T debate if they can pick whatever the aff doesn’t do and go hard for the 2NR as a voter.

# Frontlines

### AT Your Evidence is Old It’s Fine Now

#### The plant’s construction is still causing accidents—they dropped a reactor during construction just a few months ago. Galina 7/10

Galina Is, 7-10-2016, "Incident at Belarus Nuclear Power Plant Raises Safety Concerns," Belarus Digest: News and analytics on Belarusian politics, economy, human rights and more., http://belarusdigest.com/story/incident-belarus-nuclear-power-plant-raises-safety-concerns-26714

On 10 July 2016 there was an incident at the construction site of the new Astraviec Nuclear Power Plant. According to local whistle-blower Mikalai Ulasevich, a crane dropped the 330-tonne reactor from a height of 2-4 metres during a test lift. Until 26 July the officials either actively denied the incident or simply kept silent. For Belarusians, this is painfully reminiscent of Chernobyl. When the Chernobyl accident occurred in April 1986, the Soviet government chose to conceal information from the people for as long as it could. This decision exacerbated the situation for the general population, who did not know to take precautions against radiation fallout. The location of the construction site for the future nuclear plant has also caused tensions with neighbouring Lithuania. Astraviec NPP – just 50 km from the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius – poses an immediate threat to residents of Lithuania in the case of an accident. However, despite the significant social and political controversy and safety concerns the Belarusian government has chosen to continue with the project. The official line vs rumours The Ministry of Energy, the government entity responsible for the plant, released an official statement only on 26 July. It confirmed that rumours of the incident, now circulating for more than two weeks, were true. The wording of the official press release described "an emergency at the site", which occurred during "the horizontal movement of the frame". On 1 August the general contractor confirmed the safety of the reactor, but suggested that it should be up to the Belarusian authorities to decide whether to use this particular item. Belarus, the country that suffered the most severe consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in 1989, has now decided to build its own nuclear power plant. The project for the NPP, conceptualised in 2007 and first initiated in 2009, lacks both transparency and public support and controversy surrounding it is plentiful. First, the Belarusian government could not find enough funding for it, so the money had to come from Moscow with strings attached. Russia agreed to provide $9bn out of $11bn required for the NPP, as a result of which Rosatom, or Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, won the bid as the major partner in construction and supply. Secondly, the Lithuanian government protested against the choice of the NPP construction site due to its location just 12 Image from tut.byImage from the website tut.by. Made in spring 2016 by Alexander Vasyukovichmiles from the Lithuanian border. They also accused Belarusian authorities of violating the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention). The recent incident has only added to rising tensions between the two governments. According to Delfi news agency, Lithuania’s President Dalia Grybauskaitė stated on Tuesday, 26 July: Incidents at the Astravyets power plant, a nuclear facility that Belarus is building close to its border with Lithuania, show that Vilnius has reason to be concerned about the project's safety. Lithuania has sent at least three notes to the Belarusian government voicing their concerns for safety. When nuclear becomes political As Mikalai Ulasevich, the whistle-blower and member of the Belarusian oppositional United Civil Party stated on Wednesday, 27 July: “The only way to ensure the safety of the Astraviec Nuclear Power Plant is by shutting it down.” This seems to be a common sentiment among many opposition leaders.

### AT: Environment

#### No chance the plant significantly helps the environment—stats are self-serving and overstated. Keller ‘10

ON THE BELARUSIAN ENERGY DILEMMA: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR POWER OPTION BY JAMES WILLIAM KELLER THESIS Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010

In such a scenario, the EU‟s growing acceptance of nuclear power as a “renewable” or “sustainable” energy source meriting official support and promulgation is slowly growing. True, the European Commission required the closure of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia, but these were leftovers from the Soviet period with designs closely resembling the infamous RBMK-1000 reactor that malfunctioned at Chernobyl in 1986. As such, the EU‟s environmental conditionality should be viewed as strict pertaining to the type of reactor, but not the civilian use of nuclear power itself. Accordingly, Belarusian estimates reveal an extremely advantageous scenario vis-à-vis nuclear power‟s potential for emissions reductions and the prospect of European integration: construction of the BNPP will supposedly lower the country‟s GHG emissions by over two times Yakushev‟s estimate, amounting to a figure between 16 and 24 million tons.59 Such a figure is truly impressive at face value but essentially meaningless if one‟s economic pillars are imploding and significant reductions can be achieved through incremental yet no less stringent efforts to expand efficiency from fossil fuel-based sources and the development of a viable and diversified renewable energy portfolio. Emissions may be partially under control (and one nuclear plant would not guarantee that), but if an economy is purely built on the ideological and infrastructural rubble of the command economy‟s Soviet past, any attempts at Western integration have but little chance of attaining fruition. Severe discrepancies in purported emissions reductions present an egregiously weak spot in the armor of the pro-nuclear (pro-government) analytical discourse. Not only do the figures not resemble anything close to being synchronous with those of quasi-independent researchers, but the Lukashenka regime has not exactly cast itself as dutifully concerned over GHG emissions and the theorized climatic consequences of industrial pollution. Belarus acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in August 2005, six months after it entered into international force.60 However, the move was economically calculated rather than environmentally motivated due primarily to the following factors:

### AT: Cheaper

#### Wrong, it’s more expensive than traditional energy methods. Keller ‘10

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In an exhaustive and exemplary analysis on the cost of nuclear power generation, the Belarusian scientists I.N. Smolyar and V.M. Ermashkevich conclude that one must examine all elements in order to truly arrive at a representative cost per-kilowatt figure. Thus, including massive initial capital investments in establishing the needed infrastructural and technical resources and accounting for the plant‟s estimated operational lifespan, not to mention insurance, waste burial and other costs, they estimate that the plant could likely cost as much as 18.54 cents (USA) per kilowatt of energy produced.100 By way of comparison, at this rate they estimate that when all combined costs are considered, the BNPP could easily cost 3.5 times more than a traditional coal-fired plant.101 Both of these independent, quantitative-based analyses, while several years old, are in my opinion more reliable than official estimates which make the nuclear option appear more competitive than it may in fact be. But again, the dividing line in research findings closely follows the degree to which an individual is connected with official state bodies, research institutes and organizations, and what is needed before such an impactful project proceeds is complete analytical transparency from both sides.

### AT Causes Energy Independence

#### The reverse is true; it deepens dependence on Russia. Vasilevich ‘11

2011-05-25print Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant, Russian Interests and Lithuanian Protests Hanna Vasilevich http://thepointjournal.com/output/index.php?art\_id=94&spr\_change=eng

The former head of the Belarusian parliament Stanisla? Šuškievi? supports the idea of building a power plant, understanding the needs and benefits of having it. However, Šuškievi? worries about the provider in building and about methods which do not include the positions and consultations with leading Belarusian scientists in the field of nuclear energy and proper research on the location of the future plant. Šuškievi? is more suspicious of Russia’s motives as the main investor in such a strategic construction than of the recent tragedy in Fukushima. While the tragedy in Fukushima is seen as the result of a natural disaster after performing perfectly for the last 40 years, the Russian role in the Belarusian NPP construction seems for Šuškievi? to be tricky by trying to strengthen its position in the region. Šuškievi? expressed his fear that though Belarus desperately needs to become energy independent, this construction would not unleash the country, but on contrary, tie it even closer to Russia. “Though, to my mind, the main bonus in this project is the political one. Russia will control Belarus even stronger than it has been before,” says Šuškievi.

### All Belarus Cards

#### Inherency and earthquake risk—two plants on the way, on the border of Lithuania along a deadly fault line.

Earthquake zone on EU border to host Belarus nuclear plant NIKOLAJ NIELSEN MINSK, 30. MAR 2012, https://euobserver.com/belarus/115329

The drive toward the site of Belarus' future nuclear power plant goes through tall pine and white birch trees. The woods here, and in nearby Bialowieza, are among Europe's last primordial forests. Located near the Lithuanian frontier, the nuclear facility will be just 50 kilometres away from Vilnius. The first of its two reactors is to go online in 2017. The second in 2018. "The decision to build the station was entirely political ... It makes no sense to build it here. It's a fault line and the closest water source is 10 kilometres away," a Belarusian geologist - who does not want to reveal his name and who lost his job last year because a close relative spoke out against President Alexander Lukashenko - told this website. Another, better-suited, location had been identified in the east of the country, he noted. But Russia pushed for the Lithuania-border site to "test" the Europeans. The new plant will use water from the Vilia river - which is called Neris in Lithuania, and which hugs the edge of Vilnius' historic city centre. Meanwhile, the Geological Survey of Lithuania says around 40 earthquakes of significant size have struck the region since the 17th century. A tremor in 2004 registered 5.3 on the Richter scale in Vilnius. "The area selected for the new [Belarus facility] experienced the strongest earthquake ... in the history of Belarus," the Lithuanian foreign ministry told EUobsever by email. The 7.0 quake struck in 1909. Lithuania spent two years trying to get Belarus to build the plant further away and to use a different water source - a line in Minsk's 3,500-plus-page-long environmental impact assessment reportedly says radioactive and chemical contamination of the Vilia/Neris will be "within allowable limits." It failed, and construction began in 2011.

#### The plant’s construction is already causing accidents—a disaster seems inevitable and safety precautions are not being taken.

Galina Is, 7-10-2016, "Incident at Belarus Nuclear Power Plant Raises Safety Concerns," Belarus Digest: News and analytics on Belarusian politics, economy, human rights and more., http://belarusdigest.com/story/incident-belarus-nuclear-power-plant-raises-safety-concerns-26714

On 10 July 2016 there was an incident at the construction site of the new Astraviec Nuclear Power Plant. According to local whistle-blower Mikalai Ulasevich, a crane dropped the 330-tonne reactor from a height of 2-4 metres during a test lift. Until 26 July the officials either actively denied the incident or simply kept silent. For Belarusians, this is painfully reminiscent of Chernobyl. When the Chernobyl accident occurred in April 1986, the Soviet government chose to conceal information from the people for as long as it could. This decision exacerbated the situation for the general population, who did not know to take precautions against radiation fallout. The location of the construction site for the future nuclear plant has also caused tensions with neighbouring Lithuania. Astraviec NPP – just 50 km from the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius – poses an immediate threat to residents of Lithuania in the case of an accident. However, despite the significant social and political controversy and safety concerns the Belarusian government has chosen to continue with the project. The official line vs rumours The Ministry of Energy, the government entity responsible for the plant, released an official statement only on 26 July. It confirmed that rumours of the incident, now circulating for more than two weeks, were true. The wording of the official press release described "an emergency at the site", which occurred during "the horizontal movement of the frame". On 1 August the general contractor confirmed the safety of the reactor, but suggested that it should be up to the Belarusian authorities to decide whether to use this particular item. Belarus, the country that suffered the most severe consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in 1989, has now decided to build its own nuclear power plant. The project for the NPP, conceptualised in 2007 and first initiated in 2009, lacks both transparency and public support and controversy surrounding it is plentiful. First, the Belarusian government could not find enough funding for it, so the money had to come from Moscow with strings attached. Russia agreed to provide $9bn out of $11bn required for the NPP, as a result of which Rosatom, or Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, won the bid as the major partner in construction and supply. Secondly, the Lithuanian government protested against the choice of the NPP construction site due to its location just 12 Image from tut.byImage from the website tut.by. Made in spring 2016 by Alexander Vasyukovichmiles from the Lithuanian border. They also accused Belarusian authorities of violating the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention). The recent incident has only added to rising tensions between the two governments. According to Delfi news agency, Lithuania’s President Dalia Grybauskaitė stated on Tuesday, 26 July: Incidents at the Astravyets power plant, a nuclear facility that Belarus is building close to its border with Lithuania, show that Vilnius has reason to be concerned about the project's safety. Lithuania has sent at least three notes to the Belarusian government voicing their concerns for safety. When nuclear becomes political As Mikalai Ulasevich, the whistle-blower and member of the Belarusian oppositional United Civil Party stated on Wednesday, 27 July: “The only way to ensure the safety of the Astraviec Nuclear Power Plant is by shutting it down.” This seems to be a common sentiment among many opposition leaders.

#### The plant has not followed NPP safety protocol and Belarus has no intention of subjecting its plant to inspection—makes accidents inevitable. UA Today ‘16

http://uatoday.tv/society/belarus-nuclear-power-plant-disaster-waiting-to-happen-or-is-lithuania-blowing-dangers-out-of-proportion-669203.html Belarus Nuclear Power Plant: Disaster waiting to happen or is Lithuania overreacting?

Despite all the assurances from Minsk, Vilnius insisted the project was built violating numerous international safety code requirements. Shortly before the construction started, Lithuanian Ministry of Environment released its statement on the situation saying Belarus failed to conduct all the necessary research and establish all the risks the nuclear power plant posed. Watch also Chornobyl: Thirty years later Lithuanian critics also slammed Belarusian intentions to use the local river as the main source of water supply for the plant. They stated, eventually, all the technical substances from the plant would end up in the river. Additionally, the experts said, the water temperature would inevitably increase, which could make all the fish vanish. These allegations were made 6 years ago, and Lithuanian position hasn't changed since then. "We are not such idiots", Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei recently said in response to those claims. "As a country, that suffered the most from the Chornobyl accident, we would never build an unsafe power plant". The Minister claimed, raising such projects near densely populated areas was nothing new. As he pointed out, several nuclear power plants in Belgium and Serbia were even closer to big cities, than the Belarusian one. Furthermore, he added, an active Lithuanian power plant was located only two kilometres away from the Belarusian border. The Minister was quite emotional calling the situation around the construction "political Bacchanalia" and "anti-Belarusian hysteria". He assured the project was absolutely safe for everyone. However, Lithuanian officials weren't persuaded by any of this, though. The country's Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevicius said Belarus didn't do enough to refute the fears. "We have three demands, and I want to repeat them. We want to create an international commission, which will monitor the building. But Belarus has declined this proposition" Linkevicius said in an interview with Belarusian media outlet Charter97. Among the other demands the Minister mentioned stress-tests of the power plant. "They must be done in accordance to European standards. Because currently Rosatom wants to test itself, without European experts." And the last demand is the examination of the construction site. "It must have been conducted before the building started. And still, we want it done now", Linkevicius said. Both countries say they are open to negotiations. But so far it remains unclear if Belarus will agree to any of the terms Lithuania is proposing. Despite the issues, Minsk continues with the construction of the very first Belarusian power plant. According to official information, the first energy unit should be done by 2018, the second one – by 2020. Rosatom assures, all the lessons from the Chornobyl and Fukushima catastrophes have been learned. "The Earth is such a beautiful planet, but I wish it was bigger. Because if something happens, when the Belarusian nuclear power plant is built, there will be nowhere to hide", said Svetlana Alexievich, a 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature winner. Her words serve as a reminder, that everyone should fully understand responsibility for their actions.

#### Plant not safe—Accidents, environmental damage etc.

George Dvorsky, 8-9-2016, "The First Nuclear Power Plant in Belarus Is a Dangerous Fiasco," Gizmodo, http://gizmodo.com/the-first-nuclear-power-plant-in-belarus-is-a-dangerous-1785024428

In July, construction workers at the Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus dropped a 330 ton reactor shell. Weeks went by before the government admitted an “abnormal situation” had occurred, prompting international concerns about safety at the Russian-built facility—and the Belarusian government’s unwillingness to disclose information in a timely manner. Mounting mishaps at the construction site are raising concerns over safety, particularly in the neighboring country of Lithuania. Troublingly, government authorities in Belarus and those involved in the construction have been accused of withholding information, eliciting comparisons to Soviet-style secrecy during the Cold War. Belarus, in an effort to free itself from Russia’s energy grip, is building a nuclear power plant in Astravets, a district located about 96 miles (155 km) from the capital Minsk, and just 30 miles (50 km) from Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. Initial plans to build the plant were announced in the 1980s, but the Chernobyl disaster, which contaminated a quarter of Belarus, quickly put the kibosh on those plans. Now, some thirty years later, Belarus is going ahead with the nuclear plant. Things are not going well. Last month, a member of the opposition United Civic Party claimed that a 330 ton nuclear reactor shell had been dropped from a height of somewhere between 6 to 13 feet (2 to 4 meters) in preparation for installation. Two weeks went by before the Belarusian Energy Ministry confirmed that an “emergency situation” had happened. Work has now been suspended at the construction site. The Russian state-owned company Rosatom—the project’s main contractor—denied that the reactor shell was damaged, saying installation should proceed as planned pending permission from authorities. Should any defects be found with the reactor vessel, Rosatom said it would replace the piece with a new one. A pair of Rosatom subsidiaries are now inspecting the shell. And yes, a Russian company is building the plant, which seems odd given the geopolitical situation in Europe right now. Belarus, which imports about 90 percent of its gas from Russia, is trying to free itself from its dominant neighbor. At the same time, Belarus is nervous about potential Russian incursions onto its territory. Nonetheless, Moscow is jointly financing the project, which is estimated to cost between $5 billion to $22 billion. Members of the Belarusian People’s Front have been protesting Russian involvement in the construction of the plant, saying the contract should have gone to a country other than Russia. Back in April, a structural frame of the nuclear service building collapsed after workers, who were pressured to meet a deadline, poured too much concrete into the frame. As with the recent incident, Belarusian officials failed to divulge details. The president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, was suspiciously quiet after both accidents, drawing ire from domestic critics and the Lithuanian government. After downplaying the recent incident, a Lithuanian minister dismissed the “childish” explanations about the accident. Lithuania is threatening to block the plant coming online should Belarus fail to meet international safety standards. In response, Lukashenko told Lithuania to stop complaining and start helping his country run the plant. Meanwhile, the European Commission is looking into Lithuania’s complaints. These incidents aside, experts are also worrying that the Belarusian government hasn’t performed the proper environmental-impact assessments for the facility. Once the plant goes into operation (sometime around November 2018) it will draw water for its cooling reactors from a river that also supplies drinking water in Lithuania. Again, this doesn’t seem very safe.

#### Imba no net benefits to the plant card—cant even use it effectively if ever operational—no infrastructure.

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Notwithstanding these fundamental issues, they are nevertheless tangential to the socioeconomic impacts which completion of the project could exert on domestic issues. Economically, the project will deepen the Belarusian administration‟s enormous debt and expand its loan commitments to Russia, even though the BNPP will result in significant reductions in yearly expenditures for Russian gas. Ecologically, although it could marginally reduce Belarus‟s greenhouse gas emissions thanks to nuclear power‟s light carbon footprint, a major malfunction could devastate the largest remaining primeval forest in Europe and decimate the local ecotourist industry. And even in the case of stringent enforcement of all codes, laws and regulations set forth by the IAEA (to which Belarusian officials claim to assert allegiance), water sources used in the plant for energy production processes and cooling could forseeably warm these sources, negatively impacting fish stocks and the potability of local drinking water. Psychologically it could strengthen the so-called “nuclear renaissance” in the region or serve to escalate and concretize the public‟s justifiable aversion to it due to Chernobyl. No matter the case, the BNPP has the potential to heavily impact and reorient the country‟s socio-economic and socio-political trajectories. According to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, motivations for constructing the BNPP include reducing the overall cost of domestic energy production, creating energy export opportunities throughout Eastern Europe, limited local energy resources, diversifying energy supply options and decreasing imported supplies of both natural gas and oil.39 While all of these constitute legitimate reasons for implementing energy reform, especially amid strains over natural gas subsidies and the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania in December of 2009, the viability of introducing nuclear power into the exigent energy portfolio is premature and ultimately unnecessary, something to which both logic and the emerging literature both attest. With a badly outdated and inefficient energy infrastructure, not to mention the stratospheric price tag of implementing nuclear power for a country which cannot even pay its gas bills without foreign intervention, Belarus has no business considering such a scenario. Even though nuclear power is increasingly popular in developing countries such as China and India, and with new projects springing up in Finland, Lithuania and Russia, Belarus has little in the way of existing infrastructure, storage and waste facilities or technical expertise to carry out the plant‟s construction and maintenance, necessitating heavy foreign involvement. In a time of global financial turmoil and uncertainty, now is not the time to merely hope that initial estimates pan out and the plant proves its viability in reducing foreign resource dependency. For no other reason than prevailing economic conditions and Belarus‟s currently shaky fiscal and monetary disposition, nuclear power should not even be the last option; rather, it should be expunged from all domestic production scenarios. Less costly initiatives such as modernizing traditional power plants, introducing energy saving programs and exploiting Belarus‟s biomass, solar and wind power capabilities deserve special emphasis, since much of the infrastructure is in place and the initial capital investment would pale compared to the costs of nuclear power, not to mention the fact that such initiatives are specifically tagged for special funding for the EU‟s periphery through the EP.

#### No chance the plant significantly helps the environment—stats are self-serving and overstated.

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In such a scenario, the EU‟s growing acceptance of nuclear power as a “renewable” or “sustainable” energy source meriting official support and promulgation is slowly growing. True, the European Commission required the closure of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia, but these were leftovers from the Soviet period with designs closely resembling the infamous RBMK-1000 reactor that malfunctioned at Chernobyl in 1986. As such, the EU‟s environmental conditionality should be viewed as strict pertaining to the type of reactor, but not the civilian use of nuclear power itself. Accordingly, Belarusian estimates reveal an extremely advantageous scenario vis-à-vis nuclear power‟s potential for emissions reductions and the prospect of European integration: construction of the BNPP will supposedly lower the country‟s GHG emissions by over two times Yakushev‟s estimate, amounting to a figure between 16 and 24 million tons.59 Such a figure is truly impressive at face value but essentially meaningless if one‟s economic pillars are imploding and significant reductions can be achieved through incremental yet no less stringent efforts to expand efficiency from fossil fuel-based sources and the development of a viable and diversified renewable energy portfolio. Emissions may be partially under control (and one nuclear plant would not guarantee that), but if an economy is purely built on the ideological and infrastructural rubble of the command economy‟s Soviet past, any attempts at Western integration have but little chance of attaining fruition. Severe discrepancies in purported emissions reductions present an egregiously weak spot in the armor of the pro-nuclear (pro-government) analytical discourse. Not only do the figures not resemble anything close to being synchronous with those of quasi-independent researchers, but the Lukashenka regime has not exactly cast itself as dutifully concerned over GHG emissions and the theorized climatic consequences of industrial pollution. Belarus acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in August 2005, six months after it entered into international force.60 However, the move was economically calculated rather than environmentally motivated due primarily to the following factors:

#### More expensive than current energy production methods.

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In an exhaustive and exemplary analysis on the cost of nuclear power generation, the Belarusian scientists I.N. Smolyar and V.M. Ermashkevich conclude that one must examine all elements in order to truly arrive at a representative cost per-kilowatt figure. Thus, including massive initial capital investments in establishing the needed infrastructural and technical resources and accounting for the plant‟s estimated operational lifespan, not to mention insurance, waste burial and other costs, they estimate that the plant could likely cost as much as 18.54 cents (USA) per kilowatt of energy produced.100 By way of comparison, at this rate they estimate that when all combined costs are considered, the BNPP could easily cost 3.5 times more than a traditional coal-fired plant.101 Both of these independent, quantitative-based analyses, while several years old, are in my opinion more reliable than official estimates which make the nuclear option appear more competitive than it may in fact be. But again, the dividing line in research findings closely follows the degree to which an individual is connected with official state bodies, research institutes and organizations, and what is needed before such an impactful project proceeds is complete analytical transparency from both sides.

#### No net-benefits. The authoritarian regime refuses to stop construction only as a measure of strength.

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Based on the foregoing analysis, and especially in light of the VNPP project which would be completed at roughly the same time as the BNPP, a Belarusian nuclear plant is nonsensical and presents a sub-optimal choice economically, ecologically and geopolitically for Belarusian national interests. Thus, why is it still being realistically considered? The literature on the topic is overwhelmingly negative, with the stances of virtually all but government officials ranging from mild surprise and perplexity to outright condemnation of the project. The truth of the matter is that Lukashenka is insistent on bringing the project to fruition, even amid all of its uncertainties and contradictions, and no one is definite as to why. Nevertheless, his reluctance to abandon the project could be realistically attributed to a combination of the following two factors: Authoritarian resilience. Small authoritarian states in the post-Soviet realm and elsewhere have become surprisingly resilient, and Lukashenka‟s Belarus is an excellent example. They tire of being influenced by external actors who claim to know what is best for them and their economic and political progress. The belief that such a regime needs to prove its independent mettle, that it can handle internal issues and projects without external input, is often prevalent, and largely characterizes Minsk‟s frustration with both Russia and the West; and Belarusian sovereignty. Prior to the Putin presidency, Lukashenka was pro-Union State and believed he could realistically challenge Boris Yeltsin for the office of presidency if such a political entity was forged. Since Putin came to power in May of 2000, however, movement toward a political union has slowed dramatically. Realizing that his maximal power base would extend only as far as Belarus‟s international borders, Lukashenka has repeatedly stressed Belarusian sovereignty and asserted his role as the defender of the Belarusian nation, characterizing external pressures as brazen attacks on Belarus‟s sovereignty. Thus, although as a policy option the pursuit of nuclear power is riddled with contradictory holes, to him it goes beyond policy and is as part of his larger claims to political power. As a result, he does not wish to be seen capitulating to the influence of outside actors, thereby appearing weak and potentially losing his only bastion of remaining authority. This is the major motivation behind the „For Belarus‟ campaign, a nationally-based slogan designed to rally support for defending Belarus which, by implication, defends him from being deposed.

#### Plant not safe from either earthquakes or terror attacks by air. Sick card.

Dangers from Proposed Belarus and Russian Nuclear Power Plants to Lithuania Dr. Stan (Stasys) Backaitis, P.E., SAE Fellow Lithuanian American Council 2012

The recent Fukushima nuclear accident has focused the international community on the need to evaluate the risks and consequences of all possible scenarios potentially placing nuclear reactors at risk. Notwithstanding this international consensus, Belarusan and Russian authorities continue to ignore, or at best minimize, the risks of earthquakes on the reactors at the proposed NPP sites. Belarus in the EIA states that: There is a zone in the southwest part of the region (...) In 1908, according to the archives and literary sources, a big earthquake took place in Ostrovetsky district with the epicentre being near the settlement of Gudoai. It measured 6-7 on the MSK-64 scale and the effects were substantial in magnitude. However, in the following sentence, Belarus authorities assert that the “....maximum probable earthquake magnitude would not be expected to exceed a level of 5,” based on their own self-serving and unsubstantiated evaluation that there exists a “...low probability of stronger earthquake.” Russia has not made any public earthquake assessments in the Kaliningrad region, even though in the immediate vicinity of the proposed NPP a Richter 5 level earthquake was recorded as late as 2004. Furthermore, Ivan Grabelnikov, the chief engineer overseeing the Kaliningrad NPP project, in the course of a technical conference conceded that neither the VVER- 1200 reactors nor its buildings have undergone simulation testing with respect to potential aircraft crashes at the site. On the other hand, nuclear facilities operating in Western Europe are currently required to substantiate that new reactors will be able to withstand such impacts. A direct plane crash into a reactor containment building would not only destabilize the reactor, but would also jeopardize the integrity of the onsite storage facilities housing the spent but still radioactive nuclear fuel. To the best of LAC’s knowledge, no protection is provided against such incidents at either the Kaliningrad or Belarus sites. This is especially disconcerting as there exists a major northsouth flight corridor over the planned NPP site in Belarus. It is also a matter of record that in 2005, a Russian fighter jet actually crashed in Lithuania near the planned Kaliningrad NPP site.

#### Structurally, building is not secure.

Dangers from Proposed Belarus and Russian Nuclear Power Plants to Lithuania Dr. Stan (Stasys) Backaitis, P.E., SAE Fellow Lithuanian American Council 2012

Recently Russian authorities claimed that comprehensive stress tests (allegedly applying standards beyond those adopted by the EU) were performed on all NPPs in the Russian Federation with positive results. However, the structural collapse of the Leningrad-2 NPP containment building in the summer of 2011 raises questions about the veracity of such claims and the validity of the tests. Russia’s own internal reports confirm that equipment failures at nuclear power plants are fairly frequent because of “...such underlying causes as mismanagement, flaws in maintenance organization, manufacturing and design defects.” Furthermore, the VVER-1200 reactors belong to a completely new Russian reactor series, dubbed as AES-2006. They are touted by Rosatom as the latest and safest technological achievement. But the fact is, this reactor model has no extensive history of operation to substantiate such safety or reliability claims. During the construction of a similar reactor in China, the Russian contractor received repeated complaints from the Chinese concerning the quality of materials used and equipment employed. These concerns eventually led to a significant delay in the NPP construction. During the first year of operation, the reactor in China had to be stopped twice to deal with unplanned maintenance procedures. Both, the Russian Federation and Belarus ought conduct risk and safety assessments for these particular reactors applying IAEA test and evaluation protocols and provide documented assessments for review by the European Commission as well as to the Republic of Lithuania, as the principle affected and aggrieving party.

#### Asymmetrical access to information regarding the build exists—the government controls all access to reasonable information; means the pro NPP position should face extreme scrutiny. Novikau ’16,

Nuclear power debate and public opinion in Belarus: From Chernobyl to Ostrovets Aliaksandr Novikau Northern Arizona University, USA Public Understanding of Science 1– 14 © The Author(s) 2016 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0963662516647242

The nuclear power debate in Belarus demonstrates that nuclear risk communication in the country is affected by the political structure of the Belarusian society. Authoritarian politics affected all three participants in the communication process – the sender, the transmitter and the receiver. The information provided by governmental research institutions – both nuclear and sociological – was deliberately constructed in such a way as to fit with the prevailing political agenda. The mainstream media was turned into passive transmitters, amplifying the governmental voice. Finally, the public and NGOs were not only excluded from the decision-making process but also had their voices muted. Thus, the debate turned into a one-way provision of risk information to the public by governmental structures. Although formally this type of risk communication can be defined as ‘first level debates’ (Jaeger et al., 2001: 133), simply providing information can hardly be viewed as an authentic risk debate because of the lack of necessary mutual trust and respect. The issue of trust remains crucial in all nuclear debates in Belarus – from Chernobyl to Ostrovets. Discussing post-Chernobyl issues in the former Soviet Union, Shlyakhter and Wilson (1992) conclude, ‘Once trust is lost, it is difficult to regain. It is particularly hard when the people are asked to believe that the effects of radiation, which they do not understand, are limited’ (p. 255). The absence of proper communication inevitably affects public understanding of risk. When discussing post- Chernobyl issues in Belarus, Kuchinskaya (2011) rightfully says, ‘Without adequate conditions for public discussion and articulation, an affected population cannot be assumed to hold special knowledge about imperceptible hazards and their effects or to be the most risk-conscious’ (p. 419). For the nuclear energy issues discussed in Belarus during recent decades, the situation is quite similar. ‘Chernobyl syndrome’ obviously exists in Belarus. Moreover, it still dominates public opinion about nuclear energy. However, the syndrome is not the irrational fear of nuclear energy, as the pro-nuclear coalition in Belarus tends to define it. In a situation in which the majority of the population has personally experienced the negative consequences of Chernobyl, to talk of their fears of nuclear power as irrational is problematic. Obviously, trust cannot be regained simply by providing technical and economic ‘rational’ arguments. Only through an understanding of social concerns and proper responses during authentic dialogues, mutual trust can be gained.

#### AT – Plant Leads to Energy Independence From Russia

2011-05-25print Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant, Russian Interests and Lithuanian Protests Hanna Vasilevich http://thepointjournal.com/output/index.php?art\_id=94&spr\_change=eng

The former head of the Belarusian parliament Stanisla? Šuškievi? supports the idea of building a power plant, understanding the needs and benefits of having it. However, Šuškievi? worries about the provider in building and about methods which do not include the positions and consultations with leading Belarusian scientists in the field of nuclear energy and proper research on the location of the future plant. Šuškievi? is more suspicious of Russia’s motives as the main investor in such a strategic construction than of the recent tragedy in Fukushima. While the tragedy in Fukushima is seen as the result of a natural disaster after performing perfectly for the last 40 years, the Russian role in the Belarusian NPP construction seems for Šuškievi? to be tricky by trying to strengthen its position in the region. Šuškievi? expressed his fear that though Belarus desperately needs to become energy independent, this construction would not unleash the country, but on contrary, tie it even closer to Russia. “Though, to my mind, the main bonus in this project is the political one. Russia will control Belarus even stronger than it has been before,” says Šuškievi.

# 1AR

## AT: Plans Bad

### Counter Interps

#### Counter interp: the aff may *only* read a plan that prohibits the production of nuclear power in Belarus. Solves the limits standard—there’s only one aff to prep against.

#### Second counter interp: the aff may read a plan that prohibits the production of nuclear power in a specific country if a) the country is currently developing or has developed nuclear power, and b) they have evidence saying nuclear power in that country is bad. I meet. Net benefits:

#### 1. Policymaking – spec lets us focus the debate on a single implementable policy. There’s no international agent that prohibits nuclear power in every single country. Without spec, we’re not talking about real policies and what we learn is useless.

#### 2. Resolvability – since energy policies are context specific and different for each country, it’s impossible to have generalized debates about the effects of a whole res plan. Independent voter and outweighs – we can’t even have a debate if the round’s irresolvable.

#### 3. Stratskew – whole res means the neg can PIC out of any country, kills fairness since you can scoop the entirety of the aff. Also, moots your standards – if people read PICs then you’ll have to do prep on specific countries in both worlds.

#### *4. Stable advocacy—without spec the aff can shift out of disads by saying specific harms don’t link to general principle—kills fairness since if arguments can be shifted the neg has no shot of winning. This turns predictability and outweighs because the aff can make unpredictable shifts in the 1AR.*

### Reasonability

#### Use reasonability on T with a brightline of the aff prohibiting use of nuclear power and cards in the literature. You still have link and impact turn ground and generics check which means you could have engaged, I’m in the direction of the topic. Key to substantive education because there’s less unnecessary theory which trades off with topical debate. It’s not arbitrary since I have a justified brightline.

### O/V

#### 1. Generics solve- you can read NCs, Ks, and impact turns. Any reason why nuclear power is good also applies to the aff

#### 2. Lit solves- if it’s within the realm of the topic lit you should have cut cards which proves your standards link to laziness, not fairness.

### AT: Textuality

#### 1. Bare plurals can be topical with an existential reading.

Carlson 77 brackets for clarity, Carlson, Greg N. "A unified analysis of the English bare plural." Linguistics and philosophy 1.3 (1977): 413-457.

Now that we have determined that X cannot be the plural of u, its relationship to the rest of the grammar becomes much less clear. We must ask once again what it is related to, and how this relationship is represented in the grammar. A certain amount of evidence indicates that the indefinite plural use of XNP is not to be distinguished from its generic uses. Let us for the moment consider the hypothesis that there are at least two distinct determiner elements of English, both of which just happen to be pronounced ‘X’. The first is like an existential quantifier (but not quite), and accounts for the ‘indefinite plural’; the second is like a universal (but not quite) and accounts for at least one of the ‘generic’ uses of XNP (there may be a number of generic determiners, all pronunced X, so we let the one posited represent possibly a whole class of determiner elements).13 This hypothesis carries with it the claim that XNP is systematically ambiguous. However, in most cases this is not borne out by the facts (as has been noted previously, for example in Dahl(1975)). Consider the following sentences: ￼(65) Smokers are rude. (66) Dogs bark. (67) Elephants are easily trained. ￼ ￼These sentences exhibit the generic, or ‘universal’ reading.14 But what is missing is the indefinite plural, or ‘existential’ reading. Why don’t [Dogs bark] (65-67) mean (65’-67’) as well, if X is really systematically ambiguous? ￼￼Some smokers are rude. W’J Some dogs bark. Some elephants are easily trained. 65’) (67’) ￼These readings are clearly plausible pragmatically, some reason. Again, why don’t we judge the italicized XNP’s of the following sentences to be ambiguous? Either reading should be possible, but only the ‘universal’ emerges. but they are ruled out for ￼￼(68) (69) (70) Mark really loves puppies. Kris hates small ugly creatures. The man over there believes Texans to be friendly. ￼

#### 2. Multiple grammatically correct interps of the topics means you have to weigh fairness and education first – nuke power could also mean states with nuclear weapons which is a very semantically plausible interp.

#### 3. Adhering to the strict resolution text doesn’t produce good debates—topics are written by traditional old lay coaches so modification is key to nat circuit competition.

#### 4. The “topicality” rule is nonsense – you could also treat my standards like that. The “policymaking” and “stratskew” rules will also produce good debates.

### AT: Jurisdiction

#### 1. Empirically denied – judges vote on non-topical affs all the time and don’t get their contracts rescinded.

#### 2. The tournament rules don’t stipulate this is what we have to debate about, they just list it as a resolution with no external requirements.

### AT: Limits

#### 1. Lit solves –there are only 31 countries with nuclear power according to Wikipedia and even less of those will have viable lit ground. Limited case list proves you can do prep.

#### 2. Non unique- if the aff defends whole res, you still have to prep out specific advantages or you’ll still use.

#### 3. T-you overlimit because there’s only one aff under your interp. Even if my interp is slightly too large, yours ensures negs win every round because they would get lots of PICs and reactive prep strategy.

#### 4. Limits standards are bad. They discourage creativity and critical thinking by making us stick to prep instead of thinking outside the box.

### AT: Ground

#### 1. Side bias impact turns—more aff ground’s good since it compensates for short 1AR and neg reactivity that make it harder to affirm.

#### 2. T-the fact that the plan isn’t happening now proves you have qualitative ground.

#### 3. Lots of great ground against this aff – Russian heg DAs, energy security DAs, and regulation CPs.

### AT: Breadth

#### 1. T-plans are key to breadth—they let us explore different areas of the topic instead of focusing on the same aff every round.

#### 2. Not everyone reads plans—other rounds solve.

#### 3. Depth is more important—spreading ourselves thin on many issues can be done with articles—only nuanced debates with specific evidence comparison about one policy are educational.

### RVI

#### Give the aff an RVI on counter interps to T:

#### A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

#### B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible.

### Reject the Arg

#### Reject the argument on T—if they win I’ll defend whole res. A. Substantive education—theory layer goes away and we get to debate the aff advantages which still apply—outweighs since education is the only reason people join the debate. B. Aff strat—dropping the debater makes affirming impossible because there’s always some interp that the aff violates.

## AT: T-Plural

### I Meets

#### 1. I meet. Country is defined as “a nation with its own government[[1]](#footnote-1), occupying a particular territory:” and durable fiat means that multiple governments will implement the plan and carry out implementation over time as new leaders are replaced and elected.

#### 2. I meet. Reductionism is true – that’s Olson from the aff. That means the government in each instance is different from the past instance so I implement the plan in infinite countries.

### C/I

#### Counter interp: Merriam Wesbter defines country as

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/country

an indefinite usually extended expanse of land

#### I meet this definition, there are hundreds of expnases of land per country.

Net benefit: Merriam Webster’s the most accurate.

Merriam Webster no date <http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/>

For more than 150 years, in print and now online, Merriam-Webster has been America's leading and most-trusted provider of language information. Each month, our Web sites offer guidance to more than 40 million visitors. In print, our publications include Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (among the best-selling books in American history) and newly published dictionaries for English-language learners. All Merriam-Webster products and services are backed by the largest team of professional dictionary editors and writers in America, and one of the largest in the world.

#### Second counter interp: the aff can either defend whole res, or specify a single specific country in the plan text. I meet. Prefer:

#### 1. Limits – if affs can specify a couple of countries then there are literally millions of plans because you can defend any combination of actors. If I defend only one, then there’s a limited caselist. Limits are key to fairness and education because they ensure negs can engage with affs and have prep.

#### 2. Policymaking – countries never act in unison in energy policies because they have different infrastructures and legislation. Your interp forces debates about advocacies that are made up which kills education since we’re not learning about anything real.

### Reasonability

#### Use reasonability on T with a brightline of the aff prohibiting use of nuclear power and cards in the literature. You still have link and impact turn ground and generics check which means you could have engaged, I’m in the direction of the topic. Key to substantive education because there’s less unnecessary theory which trades off with topical debate. It’s not arbitrary since I have a justified brightline.

### AT: Textuality

#### 1. Multiple grammatically correct interps of the topics means you have to weigh fairness and education first – nuke power could also mean states with nuclear weapons which is a very semantically plausible interp.

#### 2. The only reason text is good is because of predictability, but that assumes you’re winning a limits standard.

#### 3. Adhering to the strict resolution text doesn’t produce good debates—topics are written by traditional old lay coaches so modification is key to nat circuit competition.

#### 4. The “topicality” rule is nonsense – you could also treat my standards like that. The “policymaking” and “stratskew” rules will also produce good debates.

#### 5. Textuality assumes truth testing but you’ve conceded comparing worlds from the aff – my burden isn’t to prove the res true, just to present a good advocacy.

### AT: Jurisdiction

#### 1. Empirically denied – judges vote on non-topical affs all the time and don’t get their contracts rescinded.

#### 2. The tournament rules don’t stipulate this is what we have to debate about, they just list it as a resolution with no external requirements.

### AT: Pragmatic Standards

#### You don’t solve any of your standards – under your interp people will just read 2 or 3 countries because it is technically plural, but still solves the harms because people will pick obscure countries with really good aff ground.

### RVI

#### Give the aff an RVI on counter interps to T:

#### A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

#### B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible.

### Reject the Arg

#### Reject the argument on T—if they win I’ll defend whole res. A. Substantive education—theory layer goes away and we get to debate the aff advantages which still apply—outweighs since education is the only reason people join the debate. B. Aff strat—dropping the debater makes affirming impossible because there’s always some interp that the aff violates.

## AT: T-Production

#### I meet your definition- it says production is the process of making things- the aff prohibits the ability for people to make nuclear energy in the future. Production doesn’t imply any temporal distinction. For example, I can make a new country and prohibit the production of illegal drugs, even if there aren’t identified cases of drug use yet. Even if I violate the text of your interp, don’t evaluate the shell because your definition flows aff- proves I’m T and should be allowed.

#### Counter interp: the aff can defend a country that’s developing the production of nuclear power if it is one of the five nuclear development front-runners.

World Nuclear 16 “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries” <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx> JW

Over 45 countries are actively considering embarking upon nuclear power programs. These range from sophisticated economies to developing nations. The front runners are UAE, Turkey, Vietnam, Belarus, and Poland.

#### Solves limits- my counter interp only adds 6 new affs to the already large caselist- it’s a drop in the bucket.

#### Solves ground- these countries are very far along in the process and not just considering it-proves there’s literature to debate the aff’s merits.

#### Key to policymaking education- arbitrarily excluding countries because they don’t have full-on programs yet excludes huge portions of the topic lit that discuss energy policy in specific places.

## AT: Libertarianism NC

### Fwk

#### Practical reason’s escapable—we can be shmagents.

Enoch David Enoch “Shmagency Revisited” JW

If it can be defended, then, constitutivism promises to yield significant payoffs . But constitutivism seems to be subject to a powerful objection. For agents need not care about their qualifications as agents, or whether some of their bodily movements count as actions. They can, it seems, be perfectly happy being shmagents – non-agent things that lack the thing purportedly constitutive of agency, but that are as similar to agents as is otherwise possible – or perhaps being something else altogether. If so, constitutivism cannot make good on its promises: For when Korsgaard replies to the agent who asks, say, "Why should I care about the hypothetical and categorical imperatives?" with "Well, otherwise you wouldn't even count as an agent, you wouldn't even be in the game of performing actions.", the skeptic can discard this reply with a simple "So-what?". What is it to her, as it were, if she qualifies as an agent or not? She would be analogous not to the chess-player who asks why she should play according to the rules, but to someone who enjoys the aesthetic qualities of (what we call) the chess board and pieces. If we tell this person that he must not move his king to a certain position because it's against the rules, and if he breaks them he won't count as playing chess, he can shrug us off with a simple "So-what?". He doesn’t care whether his manipulation of the chess pieces qualifies as chess-playing. And at this point the objectivity Velleman hopes for also collapses, because the practical reasons whose objectivity Velleman wants to secure will not reach the person who is happy being a shamgent-rather-than-an-agent, or perhaps something else entirely. The general point here is that the status of being constitutive of agency does not suffice for a normatively non-arbitrary status. Of course, if there were some independent reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent), or to perform actions, this objection would go away. But the price would be too high, for such an independent reason – one not accounted for by the constitutivist story, but rather presupposed by it – would make it impossible for constitutivism to be the whole, or the most foundational, account of normativity, or to deliver on its promised payoffs.

#### Universalizability fails—we can narrow down maxims.

Macintyre Alasdair Macintyre (professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt). “After Virtue.” 1981

How are we to decide whether this attempt to formulate a decisive test for the maxims for morality is successful or not? **Kant** himself tries to show that such maxims as ‘Always tell the truth,’ Always keep promises’, ‘Be benevolent to those in need’ and ‘Do not commit suicide’ pass his test, while such maxims as ‘Only keep promises when it is convenient to you’ fail. In fact however, even to approach a semblance of showing this, he **has to use notoriously bad arguments, the climax** of which **is** his assertion **that** any man who wills **the maxim ‘To kill myself** when the prospects of pain outweigh those of happiness’ **is inconsistent because such** willing **‘contradicts’ an impulse to life** implanted in all of us**. This is as if** someone were to assert that any man who wills **the maxim ‘Always to keep my hair** cut **short’ is inconsistent because** such **willing ‘contradicts’ an impulse to** the **growth of hair** implanted **in all of us**. But it is not just that Kant’s own arguments involve large mistakes. It is very easy to see that **many immoral and trivial non-moral maxims are vindicated by Kant’s test** quite as convincingly – in some cases more convincingly – than the moral maxims which Kant aspires to uphold. So **‘Keep all your promises throughout your entire life except one’, ‘Persecute all those who hold false religious beliefs’ and ‘Always eat mussels on Mondays in March’** will all pass Kant’s test, for all **can be consistently universalized.**

### PR = Util

#### Your framework is util:

#### 1. Rational agents would consent to a universal law to maximize happiness and increase the chance of their own interests being satisfied.

#### 2. Only util is a universalizable principle.

Singer Peter Singer, “Practical Ethics,” Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 13-14

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. **In accepting that ethical judgments must be** made from a **universal** point of view, **I am accepting that my own interests cannot,** simply because they are my interests, **count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my** very natural **concern that my own interests be looked after must**, when I think ethically, **be extended to** the interests of **others.** Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. **This requires me to weigh** up **all** these **interests and** adopt the course of action most likely to **maximize the interests of those affected.**

#### 3. Respect for human worth would justify util.

Cummiskey Cummiskey, David. “Kantian Consequentiaism.” Ethics 100 (April 1990), University of Chicago. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing** solely **the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends** any **market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

#### 4. Respecting people as ends would justify promoting their happiness.

Cummiskey 2 Cummiskey, David. “Kantian Consequentiaism.” Ethics 100 (April 1990), University of Chicago. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810

Now, **according to Kant,** the formula of the end-in-itself generates both negatives and positive duties. In the negative sense we treat persons as ends when we do not interfere with their pursuit of their (legitimate) ends. In the positive sense **we treat persons as ends when we** endeavor to **help them realize their** (legitimate) **ends.** Kant describes the positive interpretation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative as a duty to make others’ ends my own. Since, if one wills an end, on also wills the necessary means, it follows that the positive interpretation requires that we do those acts which are necessary to further the permissible ends of others. **Since Kant also maintains that “to be happy is** necessarily **the desire of every rational** but finite **being”, we have a positive duty to promote the happiness of others.** Thus, in addition to any constraints on action which Kant’s principle might generate, it also provides a rationale for a moral goal that we are obligated to pursue.

#### 5. It is non-universalizable to will an action with the foresight that it causes extinction-the result is not being able to will actions at all since everyone is dead, which is a contradiction. Extinction outweighs since it’s an infinite violation of freedom for all people.

### T: Constitutivism

#### TURN - You claim practical reason is constitutive of agency – this means every action is obligatory.

Katsafanas summarizes an argument Paul (Boston University) “Constitutivism about practical reasons” March 6th 2014 http://people.bu.edu/pkatsa/constitutivism.pdf JW

5.5 The bad action problem The constitutivist wants to move from the claim (i) action has constitutive feature F to the claim (ii) F is the standard of success for action. Railton (1997) and Clark (2001) have argued that this creates a problem: according to (i), every action has F; according to (ii), F is the standard of success for action. It follows that every action is a success. In other words, it seems that there is no distance between something’s being an action and its being a good action.

### T: Gov Control

#### Nuclear power violates libertarianism – five warrants.

Smith 13 Noah “Solar is libertarian, nuclear is statist” Noahpinion April 12th 2013 <http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.co.nz/2013/04/solar-is-libertarian-nuclear-is-statist.html> JW

Contrast this with nuclear power. [One,] Nuclear has huge fixed costs, which are difficult for private companies to pay; thus, most nuclear plants are built with the help of government loans or subsidies. The close state-corporate collusion required by nuclear power was starkly exposed in the recent Fukushima disaster. Also, nuclear [Two,] plants are giant and centralized, meaning the electricity must be piped to your house via a grid, which is constructed and controlled by the government. Also, solar is much more entrepreneurial than nuclear. [Three,] Nuclear has such high costs that only the hugest of companies, like GE, can create nuclear plants (and even then, often only with government help). Solar, on the other hand, has low fixed costs, so entrepreneurs can create solar farms with relatively little startup capital. Also, [Four,] R&D in the nuclear sector often has fixed costs and must be state-subsidized, while solar lends itself more to cheap private-sector R&D. Finally, [Five,] nuclear waste creates a lot of thorny land-use issues. Public goods are involved, since people are afraid that the waste may leak and injure them. This means that the location and operation of nuclear plants will always partially be decided by planning boards, environmental agencies, and angry town hall meetings. This is simply unavoidable in American society. But solar power has no such issues, and so the entrepreneur or independent-minded rooftop solar generator can operate largely unmolested by government.

#### TURN - nuclear power necessarily requires more state intrusion.

Martin 15 Brian (PhD in theoretical physics and is Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong) “Nuclear Power and Civil Liberties” August 2015 EnergyScience Coalition Briefing Paper No. 23 <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/15energyscience.pdf> JW

Military attack. [One,] Any country with a nuclear facility is at risk from military attack and therefore its government — so the usual thinking goes — needs to be prepared militarily itself or to be in an alliance to defend and deter attackers. Furthermore, foreign governments might suspect that nuclear facilities are being used covertly to produce nuclear weapons. The potential result is an arms race, perhaps even a nuclear arms race. This is exactly what has happened between India and Pakistan. In India, supposedly civilian nuclear facilities enabled production of nuclear weapons, stimulating a parallel process in Pakistan. Within India’s nuclear establishment, secrecy is the rule and dissent is not allowed — and likewise in Pakistan. Militaries are notorious for their suppression of civil liberties. The more militarised a society, the less free it is. Nuclear facilities push governments in more repressive directions. Terrorists and criminals. [Two,] Because nuclear facilities need to be protected against terrorists and criminals, the government needs to be active in monitoring potential threats and being prepared to counter them. This means surveillance of any suspected group or individual, training of anti-terrorist squads and worst-case planning. The so-called war on terror, declared by the US government in the aftermath of 9/11, shows what can happen when terrorism is countered by repressive government action. The mobilisation of police and intelligence services against terrorists spills over into surveillance and disruption of lawful groups, especially protesters. In summary: Nuclear power, through its characteristics — large size, large cost and potential danger — becomes a prime target for militaries, terrorists and criminals. To protect against this danger, governments need to use surveillance, disruption and curtailment of civil liberties, including the freedoms of peaceful protesters and others who are no threat. Nuclear power, in short, is a threat to freedom, including the freedom of citizens to express their views about energy policy.

1. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/country [↑](#footnote-ref-1)